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In June of 2008, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western 
Philosophy (ISCWP) convened its third Constructive Engagement conference, on the theme of 
“Comparative Philosophy Methodology.” During the opening speeches, Prof. Dunhua ZHAO, 
Chair of the Philosophy Department at Peking University, challenged the conference’s 
participants to put forward a minimal definition of “comparative philosophy” and a statement 
of its methods. Based on the papers from the conference and the extensive discussion that 
ensued, during my closing reflections at the end of the conference I offered a tentative 
synthesis of the conference’s conclusions. That summary has already been published on-line as 
part of the bi-annual ISCWP newsletter (Angle 2008). In this brief essay, I recapitulate the 
themes of my earlier summary and expand, in my own voice, on some of the key points. 
 
An important goal of the conference was to bring together both practitioners and critics 
of comparative philosophy, in its various incarnations, to reflect on and debate the 
nature of our subject. There was thus no expectation that we would all agree perfectly 
on what “comparative philosophy” is, and on how it should be done. However, we did 
discover that there was considerable agreement. Most basically, it became clear that 
comparative philosophy has at least two potential dimensions that, while they may 
interact, are at least sometimes distinct from one another: 
 
1. Use terms, ideas, or concepts from one philosophical tradition to help 
understand or interpret another philosophical tradition.  
2. Through cross-tradition engagement, seek to advance or develop philosophy.  
 
Depending on how one defines “philosophy,” often the “traditions” in question will not 
be only philosophical. Both historically and at the present moment, “Confucianism” 
surely can refer to many discourses and practices that are not in any obvious way 
philosophical. Almost all the conference participants agreed, though, that historical and  
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more recent Confucian practice has included an important philosophical dimension, 
and thus that one can treat the tradition as philosophy for the purposes of comparative  
philosophy.  
Not all participants agreed that comparative philosophy could successfully 
accomplish these goals; I will discuss in a moment some of the challenges that were 
articulated. In general, though, we thought that the goals could be met, and articulated 
some success conditions: 
 
1. Success comes in either of the above dimensions when the work is constructive. 
2. Many of us agreed that success — and constructiveness — must be measured in 
context. That is, what counts as an “advance” will be determined from within a 
given philosophical tradition, rather than from a neutral standpoint above or 
between traditions.  
3. Some of us believed that it was possible to judge which idea or tradition was 
better overall, at least in some circumstances. None of us believed that one 
could readily judge which tradition was the absolute best. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre is well-known for having argued that, notwithstanding the 
existence of a kind of incommensurability (on which see further below), it is 
sometimes possible to compare two traditions and see which one is superior 
(MacIntyre 1988). He argues that one might come to see that one’s tradition has failed 
by its own lights, and furthermore that an alternative tradition can both explain this 
failure, and does not itself fail by its own lights. In such a case it can be rational, 
MacIntyre says, to adopt the alternative tradition. MacIntyre offers various possible 
examples, and it can also be interesting to think about Chinese advocates of “complete 
Westernization” in the early twentieth century in this vein. Still, even in such cases, the 
judgment of superiority is still made from a particular standpoint that is initially rooted 
in one of the two traditions.  
If we set aside the type of case MacIntyre has in mind, then the only possible 
success criteria would seem to be internal notions of progress or fruitfulness, on the 
one hand, and a standpoint-independent idea of universal truth, on the other. In fact, if 
we grant that the only access one has to truth is via the best epistemological standards 
that one has so far come up with, then standpoint-independent truth will collapse into 
internal judgments. Therefore we seem to be on solid ground in emphasizing that 
success in comparative philosophy — the “constructive” kind of engagement that is 
referred to in the title of the conference series — is judged from within the distinct 
perspectives that the comparative philosopher is bringing into contact. One need not be 
limited to only one of the perspectives. In an essay a few years ago in comparative 
political philosophy, for example, I argued that if Chinese democratic centralism were 
to undergo certain sorts of reforms, it would then be legitimate both in its own terms, 
and from the standpoint of a Rawlsian “Law of Peoples” (Angle 2005). The exact 
significance of this result varies, depending on one’s own position; I did not offer 
either perspective as uniquely privileged.  
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Depending on the nature of the philosophical work, the ways in which its 
“constructiveness” might be evaluated will also vary. Current debates about the 
applicability of the category “virtue ethics” to early Confucianism can illustrate some 
of the complexities. For some (e.g., Van Norden 2007), the framework of virtue ethics 
can help us better interpret and understand a work like the Meng-Zi. Others have 
argued that this category highlights relatively unimportant aspects of the text, and leads 
to a misunderstanding of its actual significance in its day. Whether a “virtue ethics” 
approach to the Meng-Zi is constructive as regards textual understanding — the first 
dimension of comparative philosophy mentioned above — will depend in part on the 
outcome of debates like these. (It will also depend on the details of what a given 
scholar takes “virtue ethics” to be, since this very category is by no means univocal in 
current philosophical use.) If we turn to the second (“advance or develop”) dimension, 
we see that constructiveness will be judged by whether some version of Confucianism-
as-virtue-ethics is judged to be a fruitful development of Confucianism, as seen either 
by someone committed to the contemporary development of Confucianism as a living 
philosophical tradition, or by someone interested in the development of virtue ethics in 
ever more robust, explanatory, or transformative ways. 
Participants in the conference identified a series of challenges to comparative 
philosophy: 
 
1. Incommensurability. If it is impossible to compare or translate, then 
comparative philosophy cannot succeed.  
2. Some say that philosophy is simply one thing; there is no room for 
“comparison.”  
3. A complementary worry is that different philosophical traditions lack adequate 
common concerns.  
4. Research and teaching of comparative philosophy lacks adequate institutional 
support and potential students find it difficult to acquire the needed training. On 
this we were all in agreement. 
 
With respect to incommensurability, most of us at the conference believed that 
differences between concepts or languages or traditions did not make comparison 
impossible. Both theoretical reasons (e.g., Donald Davidson’s argument in Davidson 
1984) and practical examples (of seemingly successful comparative philosophy) were 
offered as evidence that this challenge could be overcome. My own view (as seen, for 
example, in Angle 2002) is that there is ample evidence of cross-tradition philosophical 
engagement despite the distinctiveness of each tradition, and that we can readily 
understand how such communication across differences can occur. Indeed, according 
to many plausible theories of linguistic meaning, communication across difference 
takes place even when two native speakers of the “same language” talk to one another.  
Concerning the idea that “philosophy” is one specific thing, leaving no room for 
comparison, we should acknowledge that if philosophy is defined very narrowly, it 
may be that there is not enough room for the level of different development on which 
the possibility of comparative philosophy depends. Few of us were convinced that 
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philosophy is such a narrow enterprise, however. Efforts to produce a narrow definition 
based on early Greek “philosophia” are typically extremely ahistorical — ignoring, for 
example, the evidence that philosophy was understood as a “way of life” (Hadot 1995). 
Turning to the opposite worry, that different philosophical traditions may lack common 
concerns, the most basic response is simply that many scholars have in fact found areas 
of common concern in our work across traditions, and those of us at the conference 
were therefore skeptical of any a priori argument that denied we could have done this. 
“Common concern” does not, of course, necessitate finding identical formulations of 
concepts or problems; this thought returns us to the same considerations that were 
discussed in the previous paragraph. 
The challenge of inadequate institutional support, we agreed, applies to each of our 
countries. Pioneering comparative philosophers in China, as in the U.S., have certainly 
had an impact, and there are now some institutional structures that welcome and 
nurture comparative research. But many barriers remain. In China, it is often difficult 
to be simultaneously taken seriously by specialists in different traditions, even when 
they share a single department. In the U.S., specialists in traditions other than the 
dominant Western ones are extremely rare within major graduate departments, as has 
recently been discussed in an issue of the APA’s Newsletter on Asian and Asian-
American Philosophers and Philosophies (Olberding 2008). We have a long way to go. 
Finally, on the basis of this understanding of comparative philosophy, what could 
we say about its methodology? At the conference there was quite general agreement on 
the following characteristics of a minimal methodology: 
 
1. Openness is fundamental, though so is the exercise of critical philosophical 
judgment. 
2. Traditions are not monolithic, but internally diverse; our specific methods 
should take advantage of this. 
3. The idea of family resemblance is very helpful. 
4. A focus on concepts or problems is often more constructive than the 
comparison of individual thinkers, though there are many exceptions — 
particularly if the figure studied was him or herself engaged in comparative 
work. 
5. Careful attention to issues of language and grammar is important. 
6. Adequate training and adequate institutional support is critical. 
 
There is of course a great deal that could be said about many of these characteristics, 
but the key is to stress that the “minimal” nature of the methodology does not mean 
that we each felt that a more “maximal” set of principles was needed, but could not 
agree on such principles. A few at the conference did indeed argue for a more 
demanding methodology which they felt entailed constructing a kind of neutrality 
among traditions or a perspectiveless perspective. In general the conference 
participants were not sympathetic to such an approach, and noted that some of those 
who advocated such an understanding of comparative philosophy did so in order to 
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argue that the enterprise was impossible. Most of us felt this was attacking a straw 
man. 
The general preference for a “minimal” methodology, therefore, does not express a 
compromise or a lowest common denominator. Admittedly, because comparative 
philosophical practice is diverse, this limits the number of helpful generalizations about 
methodology that can be made. Nonetheless, I feel that the conference’s agreed-upon 
methodological principles are far from empty. The idea of openness, in particular, puts 
the comparative enterprise into tension with many existing research programs in 
philosophy that are narrowly constrained by explicit or implict assumptions about their 
subject matters. Still, some at the conference commented on the minimal methodology 
by suggesting that there was no real difference between doing what is here 
characterized as “comparative philosophy” and simply doing philosophy well. This 
may be true: perhaps all philosophy is comparative philosophy. 
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